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Modern theories ofmoral judgment predict that both conscious reasoning and unconscious
emotional inﬂuences affect the way people decide about right and wrong. In a series of
experiments, we tested the effect of subliminal and conscious priming of disgust facial
expressions on moral dilemmas. “Trolley-car”-type scenarios were used, with subjects
rating how acceptable they found the utilitarian course of action to be. On average,
subliminal priming of disgust facial expressions resulted in higher rates of utilitarian
judgments compared to neutral facial expressions. Further, in replication, we found that
individual change in moral acceptability ratings due to disgust priming was modulated by
individual sensitivity to disgust, revealing a bi-directional function. Our second replication
extended this result to show that the function held for both subliminally and consciously
presented stimuli. Combined across these experiments, we show a reliable bi-directional
function, with presentation of disgust expression primes to individuals with higher disgust
sensitivity resulting in more utilitarian judgments (i.e., number-based) and presentations
to individuals with lower sensitivity resulting in more deontological judgments (i.e., rules-
based). Our results may reconcile previous conﬂicting reports of disgust modulation of
moral judgment by modeling how individual sensitivity to disgust determines the direction
and degree of this effect.
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INTRODUCTION
Moral conﬂict arises when an individual has the option of bring-
ing about the greater good by taking an emotionally unappealing
course of action. While a lot of individuals might readily endorse
the “Spock principle” – that the needs of the many outweigh the
needs of the few – there are perhaps equallymanywhowouldmake
the reverse decision in real life, for example, declining to donate
money evenwhen told categorically thatwithholding actionwould
cost lives (Unger, 1996). It is thus important to understand the fac-
tors that affect people’smoral decisions in order to help individuals
and societies maximize the outcomes that arise from them.
A classic laboratory illustration of a moral dilemma is the
trolley-car scenario, in which one has the option of pushing a
large person in front of an on-rushing trolley in order to save the
lives of ﬁve people who are ahead of it on the tracks. In philo-
sophical terms, such a dilemma can be thought of as a decision
between a deontological or utilitarian course of action; that is,
abiding by a principle (e.g., “I should not actively cause harm
to another person”) versus maximizing utility (e.g., saving the
most lives). Situations such as the trolley-car dilemma have been
used increasingly in psychological studies as a means of isolat-
ing the components of the moral decision-making process, and
in elucidating the situational factors that may inﬂuence people’s
choices.
Among the known factors that alter this decision proﬁle
is emotional state. Modern theories of decision-making have
emphasized that emotions may play a signiﬁcant role in this
process, accounting for deviations from rationalist or normative
models (Mullette-Gillman et al., 2011). Two such psychological
theories of moral decision-making that have arisen in the past
decades are the social intuitionist theory of Haidt (2001), and
the dual process theory of Greene et al. (2001, 2004), Paxton and
Greene (2010). Though these theories differ in certain partic-
ulars, both posit that emotions may interact with, or in some
cases overrule rational processes in moral decision-making. Thus,
in trolley-car-type dilemmas, subjects putatively resist the utili-
tarian option due to visceral feelings of arousal, fear or disgust
that are triggered by thoughts of having to bring about personal
harm.
In the current work, we began by investigating the effect of
subliminal disgust induction on moral decision-making. Disgust
was the focus of study in this context due to its a priori link with
moral transgressions, particularly when standards of purity are
breached (Rozin et al., 1999; Horberg et al., 2009). Accordingly,
disgust primes have been found to cause subjects to make harsher
judgments of morally unacceptable actions (Wheatley and Haidt,
2005; Schnall et al., 2008b). However, effects on moral dilemmas
(as opposed to judgments of moral wrongness) have not been
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demonstratedwithunconscious emotional cues. Showing an effect
of subliminal priming on moral dilemmas would strengthen the
case for the dual process theory by diminishing the possibility
of the primes having a direct effect on conscious, pre-decision
thoughts and reasoning. In other words, conscious primes may
affect rational deliberation through either conscious or subcon-
scious processes, whereas subliminal primes are more likely to
affect decisional outcomes via unconscious processes alone. In
the current context, we deﬁne moral intuition as the rapid, non-
reﬂective process whereby certain moral conclusions are reached
and regarded as self-evident (Haidt, 2001).
Based on previous experiments, we hypothesized that sublimi-
nal disgust priming would lead subjects to rate utilitarian actions
as less morally acceptable (i.e., a shift toward more deontological,
or principled, selections). This hypothesis was based on several
prior studies showing that disgust primes increase the severity
of judgments when subjects were asked to rate moral transgres-
sions. These studies utilized manipulations such as the hypnotic
induction of disgust (Wheatley andHaidt, 2005), disgusting smells
(Schnall et al., 2008b; Ugazio et al., 2012), and a gustatory disgust
prime (a bitter beverage; Eskine et al., 2011). Interestingly, revers-
ing the valence of the manipulation appears to have the opposite
effect – Schnall et al. (2008a) showed that priming individuals with
cleanliness concepts reduced the severity of their moral ratings on
similar vignettes.
We tested this hypothesis by priming subjects with sublim-
inally presented emotional faces, with forward and backward
masking, followed by presentation of the same face with a neu-
tral expression, a method that has previously been shown to
effectively inﬂuence behavior without affecting conscious emo-
tional state (Nomura et al., 2004; Winkielman et al., 2005).
Here, we report the results of two experiments designed to
test for priming effects under differing conditions in order to
gain a better understanding of the relationship between disgust
and moral decision-making. In brief, we ﬁnd that disgust
priming modulates utilitarian decision-making, with an aver-
age enhancement of utilitarian judgment, but that the direction
and degree of modulation depends on individual sensitivity to
disgust.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants
Experiment 1 was composed of two independent samples of
undergraduates from the National University of Singapore. Par-
ticipation was restricted only to Singaporeans in order to control
for potential cross-cultural variability in moral thinking. Sam-
ple A contained 23 participants [11 females; mean age = 22.30
(SD = 1.36)] and sample B contained 28 participants [18 females;
mean age = 21.68 (SD = 1.47)]. Two subjects from sample A
and one subject from sample B were excluded from analysis due
to technical or experimenter errors. Participants received either
course credit or monetary compensation for their time. All exper-
iments were approved by the Institutional Review Board of the
National University of Singapore, and participants gave written
informed consent before taking part in the study.
Moral dilemmas
Across the two experiments, subjects were presented with a series
of moral dilemmas and asked to judge the moral acceptability
of performing the described utilitarian option (Figure 1). Each
dilemma was composed of a short vignette leading to a crisis, fol-
lowed by an action that could resolve the crisis. Subjects were asked
to rate how morally acceptable it was to perform the described
action. These questions were all framed such that performing the
actionwould result in themost utilitarianﬁnal outcomeby causing
harm to an individual.
Fifty-one dilemmas were either created or adapted from
prior studies by Greene et al. (2001, 2004) and internet sources
(Listverse, 2007; Akorra.com, 2010; Hopkins, 2011). Dilemmas
FIGURE 1 | Example of a complete moral dilemma (broken into three screens as subjects would view it).
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were edited for word length and comprehensibility. An example
dilemma is presented within Figure 1.
A pilot studywas conducted to estimate normative acceptability
ratings for each of these dilemmas. N = 63 subjects rated the
moral acceptability of the 51 vignettes on a 5-point Likert-scale
(1 = Unacceptable, 5 = Acceptable). Across dilemmas, the mean
(SD) subject rating was 2.46 (0.88). As our goal was to examine
the decision-making, we selected the central 40 dilemmas, remov-
ing the 11 dilemmas with the most extreme average acceptability
ratings (mean acceptability below 1.54 or above 4.23) that could
produce ﬂoor or ceiling effects. These dilemmas were then split
into two lists of 20 stimuli each, with similar acceptability ratings
[mean(SD) = 2.67(0.70) and 2.68(0.71)].
Procedure
Study data were collected in the experimental suites of the
Cognitive Science Lab in Temasek Laboratories and in the Psy-
chology Department labs in the National University of Singapore.
Data were presented on Windows computers via E-Prime 1.1
(Schneider et al., 2002). Each trial consisted of two phases, a
priming phase and a moral judgment phase. Figure 2 depicts
the stimulus presentation order in each trial. The procedures
of the priming phase were adapted from an existing study
(Winkielman et al., 2005). Images of emotional facial expressions
were adapted from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces
(KDEF) database (Lundqvist et al., 1998). All images were con-
verted to gray-scale and overall luminosity was controlled. Pattern
masks were created by using Adobe Photoshop CS6 to scramble
similarly processed face stimuli (Yang et al., 2011). Face stimuli that
were used to create the mask were not used in other parts of the
experiment.
During the priming phase of each trial, participants were ﬁrst
presented with a forward pattern mask (16.66 ms), followed by a
subliminal facial prime (16.66 ms), then a backward pattern mask
(16.66 ms). A target face with the words “Male” and “Female”
on its left and right side respectively then replaced the ﬁnal
mask, and participants were required to classify the gender of
this target through a keyboard press. The target face remained
until the participant made a response (4 s max). Within each
trial, the prime and target face always belonged to the same
person. During the moral judgment phase, participants read
and made a judgment on a moral dilemma. The text of each
dilemma was divided into three screens (illustrated in Figure 1);
the ﬁrst two screens consisted of the scenario description, while
the third screen asked participants to rate the acceptability of
the described utilitarian action. To encourage a thorough read-
ing of the dilemmas, participants had to wait a minimum of 4s on
each of the ﬁrst two reading screens before they were allowed to
proceed.
Before starting the actual tasks, participants performed a prac-
tice session of three trials to familiarize themselves with the format
of the dilemmas and responses. These trials consisted of moral
decisions that did not involve personal harm.
Participants then completed two blocks of 20 moral dilemmas
each (total of 40). Subliminal primes were images of disgusted
facial expressions in one block (i.e., disgust block), and images of
neutral facial expressions in the other block (i.e., neutral block).
The order of the blocks and the moral dilemmas used within each
block were counter-balanced across participants. To reduce carry-
over effects, the two blocks were separated by a 7-minute interval,
during which participants watched a video clip of a documentary
about coral reefs. At the beginning and end of each block, par-
ticipants rated their current emotional state on four dimensions
(disgust, happiness, anger and sadness), of which disgust was our
scale of interest. Responses were collected on a 0 to 10-point scale,
with 0 being “not angry/disgusted/happy/sad at all” and 10 being
“very angry/disgusted/happy/sad”.
Finally, subjects were debriefed and asked to guess the pur-
pose of the experiment. They were speciﬁcally asked if they had
detected any subliminal primes before being debriefed on the true
FIGURE 2 | Schematic of one experimental trial (priming phase +moral judgment phase).The face shown here is M31DI from the Karolinska Directed
Emotional Faces (KDEF) stimulus set.
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purpose of the study. None of the participants reported detecting
the primes or guessed the study aims.
Subjects in sample B underwent an identical procedure to those
in Sample A, with the addition of completing the Disgust Scale –
Revised [DS-R; (Haidt et al., 1994), modiﬁed by Olatunji et al.
(2007)]. We added this scale with the hypothesis that disgust sen-
sitivity would moderate the modulation of moral judgment by
disgust priming observed in Sample A.
RESULTS
SAMPLE A
Mean acceptability ratings were higher in the disgust condition
(M = 2.59, SD = 0.52) than the neutral condition (M = 2.40,
SD = 0.37), t(22) = 3.03, p < 0.01, d = 0.63.
As this effect was in the opposite direction of our antici-
pated effect, based upon prior studies (Wheatley and Haidt, 2005;
Schnall et al., 2008b), we immediately performed a replication in
an independent sample. The sole change between the two exper-
iments was the addition of the Disgust Scale – Revised [DS-R;
(Haidt et al., 1994), modiﬁed by Olatunji et al. (2007)] at the end
of the experimental session.
SAMPLE B
The replication sample yielded similar results: the mean accept-
ability rating in the disgust condition (M = 2.65, SD = 0.40) was
higher than that in the neutral condition [M = 2.50, SD = 0.40;
t(27) = 2.36, p < 0.05, d = 0.45]. Combining samples A and
B yielded a highly signiﬁcant main effect [disgust: M = 2.63,
SD= 0.45; neutral: (M = 2.46, SD= 0.39), t(50)= 3.75, p< 0.001,
d = 0.53 (Figure 3A)].
To test whether this change represented a switch in the valence
(as opposed to the intensity) of subjects’ responses, we collapsed
the 4-point responses into two bins: “acceptable” and “unac-
ceptable.” We found that the mean proportion of questions to
which subjects responded “acceptable” was signiﬁcantly higher
in the disgust group (56.47%) than the neutral group (49.80%),
t(50) = 3.20, p < 0.01, d = 0.45.
Difference scores were then obtained for each participant by
subtracting the mean acceptability ratings in the neutral con-
dition from the disgust condition. A positive difference score
indicates higher acceptability ratings in the disgust relative to
the neutral condition. These scores were positively correlated
with DS-R scores in the replication sample (r = 0.47, p < 0.05;
Figure 3B). A one-way repeated-measures analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) between the disgust and neutral conditions withDS-R
as a covariatewas just above the threshold of statistical signiﬁcance,
[F(1,26) = 3.87, p = 0.06, η2partial = 0.13] (moderate effect size;
Richardson, 2011).
We tested for differences in participants’ self-reported level
of disgust by performing one-sided t-tests of the change in
rating against 0. Disgust ratings were signiﬁcantly increased
between the beginning and end of both disgust [t(50) = 5.94,
p < 0.001] and neutral blocks [t(50) = 5.44, p < 0.001], with
no signiﬁcant difference in the change between these blocks [dis-
gust: M = 1.16, SD = 1.39; neutral (M = 1.18, SD = 1.55),
t(50) = 0.10, n.s.]. The change in self-reported disgust over the
disgust block was not signiﬁcantly correlated with DS-R (r = 0.11,
n.s.).
Our analysis was focused on the emotion of disgust, given our
use of disgust expressions and the prior literature’s focus on dis-
gust. However, as we also collected information that could reveal
state alterations in three other emotions (anger, sadness, and
happiness), we also tested for manipulation-related alterations in
these. Interestingly, we found signiﬁcant increases across all blocks
in anger [Disgust: t(50) = 3.79, p < 0.001; Neutral: t(50) = 3.19,
p < 0.05] and sadness [Disgust: t(50) = 4.09, p < 0.001; Neutral:
t(50) = 4.02, p < 0.001] and a signiﬁcant decrease in happiness
[Disgust: t(50) = −5.59, p < 0.001; Neutral: t(50) = −5.08,
p < 0.001]. There was no signiﬁcant difference in the changes
of these other emotions between the disgust and neutral
blocks.
A 2x2 between-subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted to test for differences between the counter-balancing
FIGURE 3 | (A) Subliminal disgust priming followed by self-paced screen
presentations of moral dilemmas caused subjects to make more utilitarian
responses. Error bars represent +/− 1 SE. (B)The degree of inﬂuence of the
prime (as measured by the difference in mean response in the disgust and
neutral conditions) is moderated by disgust sensitivity. Note the bi-directional
function, with increased acceptability (more utilitarian) ratings for individuals
with higher sensitivity and decreased acceptability for individuals with lower
sensitivity.
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conditions. We found no signiﬁcant interaction between the
two counterbalanced Lists and Orders, [F(1,47) = 0.58, n.s.],
and no main effects of List, [F(1,47) = 0.76, n.s.], or Order,
[F(1,47) = 0.21, n.s.]
As the results obtained in Experiment 1 ran counter to the
direction found in most previous published experiments, we ran
a second experiment using conscious primes, which were used by
a majority of previous studies, to see if the same pattern of results
would hold.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 26 undergraduates (16 females) at the National
University of Singapore. Participants received monetary compen-
sation. Their mean age was 21.73 (SD = 1.71). Participation was
restricted to Singaporeans to control for cross-cultural variability.
Procedure
In contrast to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 the emotional primes
were presented consciously. This difference occurred during the
priming phase, during which participants were ﬁrst presented
with an image of a face for 2–3 s (jittered). The word “Male”
and “Female” then appeared on the left and right side of the face
respectively, cueing participants to classify the gender of the face,
with a maximum of 1 s to make their response. This altered prim-
ing phase was then followed by the moral judgment phase, which
was unaltered from Experiment 1.
RESULTS
Using conscious priming, we found no signiﬁcant main effect
of emotion on moral acceptability between the disgust condi-
tion (Figure 4A; M = 2.41, SD = 0.44) and neutral condition
(M = 2.40, SD = 0.46), [t(25) = 1.71, n.s]. However, differ-
ence scores were once again positively correlated with individ-
ual disgust sensitivity (DS-R) scores in this sample (r = 0.43,
p < 0.05; Figure 4B), and the one-way repeated-measures
ANCOVAwithDS-R as a covariate was signiﬁcant, F(1,24) = 5.08,
p < 0.05, η2partial = 0.18 (moderate effect size; Richardson,
2011), suggesting that DS-R was still a moderator of the priming
effect.
As in Experiment 1, self-reported disgust increased signiﬁcantly
from the beginning to the end of both the disgust [t(25) = 4.48,
p < 0.001] and neutral blocks [t(25) = 2.72, p < 0.05]. These
change in these levels was not signiﬁcantly different between the
disgust block (M = 1.03, SD = 1.18) and the neutral block
(M = 0.96, SD = 1.80), [t(25) = 0.22, n.s.]. Again, there was no
correlation between DS-R and self-reported increases in disgust in
the block with the disgust primes (r = 0.10, n.s.).
Certain non-disgust emotions were also signiﬁcantly altered by
this paradigm. Subjects felt signiﬁcantly less happy after the disgust
block [t(25)=−2.95, p< 0.05], and signiﬁcantly sadder after both
blocks [Disgust: t(25) = 2.162, p < 0.001; Neutral: t(25) = 2.10,
p < 0.001]. There was no signiﬁcant difference in the changes of
these other emotions between the disgust and neutral blocks.
A 2x2 between-subject ANOVA was conducted to test for dif-
ferences between the counter-balancing conditions. We found no
signiﬁcant interaction between the two counterbalancing Lists
and Orders, [F(1,22) = 3.56, n.s.], and no main effects of List
[F(1,22) = 0.55, n.s.], or Order, [F(1,22) = 0.44, n.s.].
COMBINED ANALYSIS
To test the effects of subliminal vs. conscious priming, we com-
bining the data from experiments 1b and 2 into a single model
with change in acceptability rating as a dependent variable, type
of priming as a factor, and DS-R as a covariate. We found a sig-
niﬁcant effect of DS-R, [F(1,50) = 12.67], p = 0.001, no effect of
priming type, [F(1,50) = 0.29, n.s.], and no signiﬁcant interaction
[F(1,50) = 0.194, n.s.].
DISCUSSION
We ﬁnd that the moral acceptability of a utilitarian action is
bi-directionally modulated by disgust facial expressions as a func-
tion of individual sensitivity to disgust. This function was found
across both subliminal and conscious presentation of disgust facial
expressions. This result clearly shows that individual appraisal of
the stimuli determines both the direction and size of judgment
modulation.
Our original experimental hypothesis was that subliminal dis-
gust primingwould decrease the acceptability of utilitarian actions
in trolley-car type moral dilemmas. We did not ﬁnd evidence in
support of this. Rather, our results suggest an explanation for
the conﬂicting ﬁndings across previous studies. We discuss the
possibility that rather than acting directly through induced dis-
gust emotions, the disgust primes may alter moral judgment by
inﬂuencing social processing.
DISGUST PRIMING MODULATES MORAL JUDGMENT
Rational models of decision-making assert that alternatives are
weighed based on the expected value of outcomes, and place little
or no emphasis on emotional processes. Our data add to a grow-
ing body of work that demonstrates that emotional information
is regularly integrated in decision-making. Within the realm of
moral decision-making, the dual process theory of Greene et al.
(2001, 2004), Paxton and Greene (2010) has been one of the
leading attempts to formalize this. Their theory proposes that
deontological and utilitarian judgments are driven by dissociable
cognitive systems, and that subjects tend to make more utilitarian
judgments when they engage in controlled, rational processing,
and more deontological judgments when using intuitions or emo-
tion. Speciﬁc emotional states can thus be incorporated into the
decision-making process, causing subjects to deviate from their
baseline proﬁle of responding.
Superﬁcially, the effects found in the current paradigm run
counter to our a priori hypothesis that disgust facial expressions
would result in decreased moral acceptability for the utilitarian
action. Unfortunately, two recent studies have suggested that the
effects of disgust-priming on moral decision-making are not so
simple. Cummins and Cummins (2012) reported that exposure
to positive visual stimuli increased the number of deontological
decisions selected by subjects, and La Rosa et al. (2011) found that
priming with disgusting images resulted in less severe judgments
in such moral dilemmas. In summary, although a larger num-
ber of published studies to date have linked disgust priming to
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Conscious disgust priming followed by self-paced screen
presentations of moral dilemmas had no main effect on moral judgments.
Error bars represent +/− 1 SE. (B)The degree of inﬂuence of the conscious
prime (as measured by the difference in mean response in the disgust and
neutral conditions) is moderated by disgust sensitivity. Note the bi-directional
function, with increased acceptability (more utilitarian) ratings for individuals
with higher sensitivity and decreased acceptability for individuals with lower
sensitivity.
harsher moral judgments and more deontological choices, there
have also been multiple demonstrations of effects in the opposite
direction.
Our current data suggest a potential explanation for these
mixed ﬁndings: the effect of disgust priming on moral judgments
is moderated by how sensitive the individual is to disgust stim-
uli. Thus, in samples where average disgust sensitivity is relatively
low, the average effect of disgust priming would be to decrease
levels of utilitarian responding (lower acceptability), potentially
resulting in the disgust-induced harsher judgments found in early
publications (Wheatley and Haidt, 2005; Schnall et al., 2008b;
Eskine et al., 2011; Ugazio et al., 2012). Samples with “average”
levels of disgust sensitivity would lead to no average effect (as we
see in Experiment 2, and which may have occurred in numer-
ous experiments which went unpublished). Finally, samples with
participants high in disgust sensitivity (as in Experiment 1B, and
presumably 1A), would average an increase in utilitarian judg-
ments (higher acceptability ratings), which might also account
for the results of multiple recent studies (La Rosa et al., 2011;
Cummins and Cummins, 2012).
With the current dataset, we cannot make any deﬁnitive claims
about the mechanisms that underlie the modulatory effect of dis-
gust sensitivity. We discuss one potential candidate – sociality – in
the following section. However, further work using neuroimaging
or different behavioral paradigms is necessary to answer this open
question.
ROLE OF SOCIALITY IN MORAL DECISION-MAKING
Although disgust sensitivity moderates the effects of disgust prim-
ing, the psychological mechanisms responsible for altering an
individual’s decisions may not be the actual induction of disgust.
This is supported by the fact that while we did ﬁnd an increase in
subjective disgust ratings over the disgust block, the change in state
did not correlate with changes in acceptability ratings or disgust
sensitivity, and was also found over the neutral block.
We speculate that, rather than inducing disgust emotions, the
disgust primes may alter moral judgment by inﬂuencing social
processing, possibly through altering individual prosocial pref-
erences. Supporting this theory, it has been demonstrated that
dehumanization of the person to be sacriﬁced in the dilemma can
cause subjects to choose the utilitarian option more frequently
(Majdandzic et al., 2012), and disgust, in turn, has been shown
to facilitate dehumanization (Hodson and Costello, 2007; Buckels
and Trapnell, 2013).
Sociality may come into play to a much greater degree in our
study because of our choice of disgust facial expressions as a prime,
as opposed to disgusting environments or scenes.Wild et al. (2001)
theorized that emotional contagion from viewing the expressions
of conspeciﬁcs may be a “prewired” mechanism that is crucial
for effective social interaction, whereas aversion to disgusting pic-
tures or environments may not have the same degree of social
relevance. Inducing emotions by observing conspeciﬁcs may thus
be different from viewing a scene or appraising an environment
due to these additional social cues. In support of this, numer-
ous studies have shown differential neural processing for faces
and scenes (Sabatinelli et al., 2011). Importantly, face process-
ing regions (anterior fusiform gyrus and middle temporal gyrus),
are involved in processing emotional face stimuli even after sub-
traction of activation to neutral faces to account for perceptual
processes. Testing the paths from disgust to sociality to moral
decisions in a single study is thus a logical next step in this area of
research.
SUBLIMINAL vs. CONSCIOUS PRIMING
With disgust sensitivity as a covariate in our model, both sub-
liminal and conscious disgust primes altered moral judgments.
This strengthens the case for the dual process model (Greene et al.,
2001) by showing that information presented outside of conscious
awareness can still be factored intomoral judgments anddecisions.
We also corroborate the ﬁndings of other researchers who have
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reported subliminal priming effects formoral rules (Broeders et al.,
2011), and religious primes (Saraglou et al., 2009) on subsequent
moral behavior.
Previous studies have suggested that subliminal emotional
primes have a stronger effect than supraliminal primes on subjects’
subjective ratings of subsequently presented stimuli (Murphy and
Zajonc, 1993; Rotteveel et al., 2001). These authors argued that
emotional information from subliminal primes travels via a more
direct neural pathway to be integrated in decisions and output
than information from conscious primes. Indeed, several fMRI
studies have found evidence for differences in the neural process-
ing of subliminal and supraliminal stimuli (Dehaene et al., 2001;
Kouider et al., 2007).
Within our study, given the mean difference in moral judgment
in experiment 1 (subliminal) and the lack of a mean difference
in experiment 2 (conscious primes), it could be tempting to
conclude that the effects of subliminal priming were stronger
than that of supraliminal priming. However, when individual
sensitivity is taken into account, presentation threshold (sub-
liminal vs. conscious) did not moderate the effects of disgust
priming on moral judgments. This highlights the importance of
using individual sensitivity as a covariate before interrogating the
effects of other experimental variables in future studies of emo-
tion and moral judgment. The domain-speciﬁcity of differences
between subliminal and conscious remains to be explored, and
our present ﬁndings may not generalize to priming studies as a
whole.
CHANGES IN NON-DISGUST EMOTIONS
Besides disgust, we also collected subjective ratings of three other
emotions (happiness, sadness, and anger) before and after each
block of dilemmas. Interestingly, we found increases in anger
and sadness and decreases in happiness on all task blocks in
Experiment 1, and moderate changes in many of these emo-
tions in Experiment 2. These data suggest that the act of
deliberating trolley-car type moral dilemmas on its own may
be sufﬁcient to induce a range of negative-valenced emotions.
We also speculate that variance associated with these changes
may have masked any increase in disgust that was speciﬁc to
the priming effect in our current experiment. Further research
could be performed to disentangle the effects of disgust on moral
decision-making from those of negative-valenced emotions more
generally.
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
Our experiment is the ﬁrst to test the effects of emotional prim-
ing on moral dilemmas in an Asian population, raising the issue
of cultural differences with other published work. Holding other
variables constant, Moore et al. (2011) found that college students
in the USA and Hong Kong did not differ signiﬁcantly in their
response patterns to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas,
suggesting that baseline responding alone did not account for our
ﬁndings. However, there is some evidence that triggers of disgust
may differ based on cultural norms (Haidt et al., 1993) or political
attitudes (Inbar et al., 2009). Replication of the current ﬁnding in
aWestern population is thus needed to deﬁnitively disconﬁrm this
alternative hypothesis.
CONCLUSION
In the current set of studies, we present evidence that disgust
sensitivity is a moderator of the effect of disgust priming on moral
judgments. These data complement the body of evidence showing
that both reason and emotion play a part in guiding moral judg-
ment while offering an explanation for the contradictory results
in this literature.
The subtlety of the priming used in this experiment coupled
with its relatively large effect sizes lead us to speculate that these
effects may not just be phenomena observed in the laboratory,
but may reﬂect responses to social cues (e.g., microexpressions)
in real-world situations. If so, it may be incumbent on us to take
extra care when making moral judgments to ensure that reason
truly prevails.
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